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Introduction 
The collection, retention, manipulation, 
exchange and correction of personal 
data in Europe have once again become 
a matter of substantial interest. The last 
time the use of data constituted an 
important political issue in Europe, in 
the 1970s, the result (at the European 
level) was the Council of Europe’s 
Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, which 
opened for signature in 1981. This 
Convention, to which all EU member 
states are party, still sets the standard 
for data use in Europe. 
The EU adopted Directive 95/46 on 
data protection, based largely on the 
Council of Europe’s standard, which 
had to be transposed by the member 
states by 25 October 1998.
1 The 
Commission prepared a first report on 
its transposition in 2003. The European 
Data Protection Supervisor was created 
in 2001 to provide an independent body 
to ensure that the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of individuals – in 
particular their privacy – are respected 
when the EC institutions and bodies 
process personal data or develop new 
policies. 
Since the attacks in the United States of 
11 September 2001, data use has once 
again moved up the political agenda. 
The combination of very substantial 
technological advances in the 
collection, retention, use and storage of 
                                                 
1 It has now been augmented by Directive 
2002/58. 
data and the heightened concerns about 
security provided a new environment 
for data issues. One of the outcomes of 
the new environment was the decision 
by the US authorities to collect and 
retain data on individuals coming to the 
US by air – a measure intended to 
increase US security.
2 This US legal 
act, however, had consequences for data 
protection in the EU. In order to provide 
a common basis for the transmission of 
personal data by EU transport 
companies to the US authorities, an 
agreement was entered into between the 
EU and US on 28 May 2004 regulating 
the field. The agreement was attacked 
before the European Court of Justice by 
the European Parliament on a number 
of grounds, not least the inadequacy of 
protection of individual data. On 30 
May 2006, the European Court of 
Justice found that the agreement had 
been adopted on the wrong legal basis 
and gave the parties until 30 September 
2006 to adopt a new agreement on the 
correct basis.
3 
On 6 October 2006, the Council 
adopted a decision to enter into a new 
                                                 
2 The US Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act 2001. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the issues of the 
PNR decision, see E. Guild and E. Brouwer, 
The Political Life of Data: The ECJ Decision 
on the PNR agreement between the EU and the 
US, CEPS Policy Brief No. 110, Brussels, July 
2006. 
agreement with the USA regulating 
PNR and the new EU-US agreement 
was published on 11 October 2006 
(though subject to language checks).
4 In 
this note I will address some of the 
issues that arise as a result of the new 
agreement, in particular, the differences 
between the first agreement and the new 
one that affect the protection of data. 
The key issues regarding 
the new agreement 
The EU and US took the opportunity of 
the need to adopt a new agreement to 
include a number of changes to it, 
despite the fact that the agreement is a 
temporary one and new negotiations 
will begin soon to replace it. For the 
EU, the original PNR provision consists 
of three main documents – the Council 
Decision approving signature, the 
Agreement and the Undertakings of the 
Department of Homeland Security of 11 
May 2004. The new provision includes 
the Council Decision, which is now 
substantially developed, the Agreement 
which largely remains the same (though 
there are some changes of significance) 
and a letter of interpretation dated 11 
October 2006 from the US Department 
of Homeland Security, which 
effectively unilaterally amends the 
Undertakings in so far as the letter 
states how the US authorities interpret 
                                                 
4 Council Document 13216/06. 
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the provision of the Undertaking and 
makes certain changes to the 
Undertakings. Twelve issues, 
summarised below, were identified as 
key regarding the new agreement and 
its interpretation.
5 
Push-pull. Under the first agreement, 
the US authorities (in the form of the 
Homeland Security Department) had 
the power to enter the databases of 
carriers and to pull out information 
(limited to the 34 specified items in the 
Undertaking) that it wanted. The reason 
for this was that European carriers did 
not have in place the technology to deal 
with the preferable (from the 
perspective of data protection) system 
of ‘push’ – whereby the US authorities 
would have to make a request and the 
carriers would provide the specified 
information. It was agreed in 2004 that 
the system would move to a push one as 
soon as the technology was in place. 
According to a report by the EU 
Working Party on Protection of 
Individuals regarding the Processing of 
Personal Data, dated 14 June 2006, all 
the technical requirements are in place 
for a push system to be implemented. 
Nonetheless, the new agreement states 
that US authorities should be allowed to 
access data directly. 
Time limits and frequency. Under the 
2004 agreement, the US authorities had 
only 72 hours before a flight to seek 
data and a limit on the number of times 
it can check data. Under the new 
agreement, the 72-hour limit is no 
longer final and there is no limit on the 
number of times the US authorities can 
check the data. 
Purpose limitation. The purposes for 
which data could be used were already 
fairly wide in the first agreement, 
including of course preventing and 
combating terrorism, related crimes, 
serious crimes that are transnational in 
nature, flights from warrants or custody 
for the designated crimes. In the second 
agreement as augmented by the letter of 
understanding, the data may also be 
used in the context of infectious disease 
for the protection of vital interests, 
which itself is subject to a wide scope. 
                                                 
5 Letter of 10 October 2006, from Sophie in’t 
Veld, MEP and rapporteur for the EU-US 
Agreement on PNR, to Commissioner Franco 
Frattini. 
Sharing data. The new agreement and 
its various associated documents widen 
substantially the number of agencies 
with which the US authorities may 
share data. It is not entirely clear 
whether the EU authorities have a clear 
description of the agencies which may 
be provided with data on EU citizens. 
Number and nature of the data. The 
letter of understanding states that the 
US authorities must have the option to 
seek additional data, particularly if the 
system moves to a push rather than a 
pull format. This of course raises 
questions as to whether the US 
authorities have been strictly complying 
with the limit on the data they are 
permitted to obtain under the pull 
system. The Working Party on 
Protection of Individuals with regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data in its 
report of 14 June 2006 specified that 
only 19 data items were, its opinion, 
appropriate for sharing (and the list of 
19 differs not only in number but in 
elements from the list of 34 under the 
current agreement). 
Data retention. Under the initial 
agreement, data had to be destroyed 
after 3.5 years (at least in principle). In 
the new agreement’s letter of 
understanding, the US authorities 
indicate that as no data will actually 
have had to be destroyed before the end 
of the current agreement “questions of 
whether and when to destroy PNR data 
collected in accordance with the 
Undertakings will be addressed by the 
United States and the European Union 
as part of future discussions.”  
Evaluation. A joint evaluation took 
place in May 2004. The report of this 
evaluation is not public, though it would 
be very helpful if it were released, as no 
doubt it would reassure EU citizens as 
to the propriety of data use by the US 
authorities. In the new agreement, doubt 
is cast over whether there will ever be 
another joint evaluation. 
Data protection. The Council has 
determined that the US authorities 
follow satisfactory procedures for 
protecting EU data. Questions can 
nevertheless be raised about whether 
this is in fact the case. 
Legal position of EU citizens. Pro-
cedures need to be put in place to 
inform EU citizens of the transfer of 
their data and to ensure they have 
information should they wish to 
complain. A detailed legal analysis is 
needed to establish the level of 
protection of data and the potential 
gaps. 
Legal status. It is very unclear what the 
legal status of the ‘letter of 
understanding’ is. It appears not only to 
interpret the agreement and the 
Undertakings but to amend them and 
point to changes the US authorities will 
seek in the future.  
Democratic and parliamentary scrutiny. 
This is a very intra-EU issue, the result 
of the European Court of Justice 
Decision. The new legal base for the 
agreement does not provide a role for 
the European Parliament. As 
preparations are already taking place 
towards the negotiation of yet another 
agreement to replace the current one, 
the European Parliament is concerned 
about how its views will be taken into 
account. 
Implications for transfer of other data. 
There are concerns about the 
consequences of the PNR agreement for 
other data transfer agreements. 
The foregoing issues provide an 
impressive list of concerns that have 
been voiced by the European 
Parliament’s rapporteur. However, it 
does not cover all of the issues that the 
new agreement raises, in particular, 
redress and protection of the individual. 
Protecting the individual 
As a result of the transfer of faulty data 
from the Canadian authorities to their 
US counterparts, Maher Arar, a dual 
Canadian/Syrian citizen was stopped 
when in transit in New York on his way 
to Canada, on suspicion of terrorist 
involvement in September 2002. He 
was sent to Syria where he was detained 
and tortured for over a year. When he 
finally returned to Canada in October 
2003, a federal inquiry led by a retired 
Supreme Court judge was established to 
determine how this had happened. The 
inquiry published its findings in 
September 2006, which exonerated Mr 
Arar of any suspicion of involvement 
with terrorist activities and found 
serious flaws in the manner in which 
data had been transferred by Canadian 
services to their US counterparts and on 
the basis of which Mr Arar was 
suspected by the US authorities of 
involvement with terrorism. On 26 
January 2007, the Canadian Prime  
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Minister issued a formal apology to Mr 
Arar and offered him compensation in 
the amount of CAN$10.5 million.  
Inaccurate data transmission can have 
horrifying consequences for the 
individual, as in the case of Mr Arar. It 
can also be very expensive for 
governments.  
The new EU-US PNR Agreement 
contains an innovation over its 
predecessor in that it states “this 
Agreement does not create or confer 
any right of benefit on any other person 
or entity, private or public”. Is this to be 
understood as seeking to deprive 
someone like Mr Arar from obtaining 
redress in the event that his data are 
improperly transmitted and used? If so 
this is a very unfortunate attempt by the 
parties to deny responsibility for their 
acts. 
The new Council Decision approving 
the Agreement also contains a new 
Article 4 that states that member states 
may exercise their existing powers to 
suspend data flows to the US authorities 
in order to protect individuals with 
regard to the processing of their 
personal data in two cases: 
•  Where a competent US authority has 
determined that the Department of 
Homeland Security is in breach of 
the applicable standards of 
protection; or 
•  Where there is a substantial 
likelihood that the applicable 
standards of protection are being 
infringed, there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the DHS 
is not taking or will not take 
adequate and timely steps to settle 
the case at issue, the continuing 
transfer would create an imminent 
risk of grave harm to data subjects, 
and the competent authorities in the 
member states have made reasonable 
efforts in the circumstances to 
provide DHS with notice and an 
opportunity to respond. 
The first part of this article moves 
responsibility for determining data 
breaches to the US authorities in 
accordance with their laws. As the 
person who will be affected is the EU 
citizen, this may not be entirely 
satisfactory. As was the case for Mr 
Arar, the US authorities have refused 
even to entertain the request by the 
Canadian authorities for information 
regarding his treatment, let alone 
participate in determining the truth or 
compensating Mr Arar for the damage 
that their action caused him.  
The second part of the provision moves 
responsibility for protection of citizens 
of the Union to their national 
governments. In terms of EU solidarity, 
this is very unfortunate as it clearly and 
unambiguously breaks the common 
responsibility of the member states to 
protect their citizens. Further, it places 
the bar exceedingly high in respect of a 
decision to cease participation in the 
data provision system. It also permits 
one member state to determine that the 
US authorities are not applying the 
required standard of protection but it 
does not provide for any solidarity from 
the other member states. If this is a 
common agreement, then the 
commitments must be common as well.  
If citizens of any member state are at 
risk of treatment similar to that which 
the US authorities meted out to Mr 
Arar, all member states should be 
engaged in the protection of that citizen 
and act in solidarity to protect all 
citizens of the Union against harmful 
use of personal data. 